vSphere 8 is getting Update 2 – Announcement at…

vSphere 8 is getting Update 2 – Announcement at…

VMware is gearing up for a significant update with vSphere 8 Update 2, and it’s set to make waves in the realm of virtualization. Anticipated for release in Q3 2023, this update promises to bring exciting changes that will have a positive impact on the daily routines of VMware administrators.


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CVE-2022-40982 (Downfall) and VMware ESXi: No ESXi Patch – Fix Is CPU Microcode in Cisco UCS M5/M6 Firmware

CVE-2022-40982 on VMware: no VMSA or ESXi patch. The fix is Intel microcode in the server BIOS, on Cisco UCS M5/M6 in 4.3(2b) or 4.2(3h).

Downfall (CVE-2022-40982, Intel Gather Data Sampling) vulnerability logo

Short answer: VMware never published a VMSA or an ESXi patch for CVE-2022-40982 (Downfall / Gather Data Sampling). The VMware Security Response Center said hypervisor patches are not required. The fix is Intel CPU microcode, which you get with a server BIOS/firmware update. On Cisco UCS, the M5 fix is defect CSCwf30468 and the M6 fix is CSCwf30460, both in UCS Manager 4.3(2b) and 4.2(3h). Intel says some workloads may lose up to 50% performance.

CVE-2022-40982 and VMware: is there a VMSA or ESXi patch?

No. On 8 August 2023, the day Intel published INTEL-SA-00828, the VMware Security Response Center posted its response. It rated the issue Moderate (CVSSv3.1 6.5) and said VMware hypervisors may be impacted when they run on an affected Intel processor, but that hypervisor patches are not required. VMware told customers to check INTEL-SA-00828 to see whether their CPU family is affected, and to ask their hardware vendor for a firmware update. No VMSA and no ESXi build is tied to this CVE. So when a scanner flags ESXi for CVE-2022-40982, the fix belongs to the server BIOS, not to an ESXi patch baseline or image.

LayerWhat fixes DownfallAction
CPUIntel microcode (INTEL-SA-00828, 2023.3 IPU)Comes with the server BIOS
Server firmwareBIOS that contains the new microcodeCisco UCS: 4.3(2b) / 4.2(3h) or later (see below)
ESXiNo patch required (VMware statement)None for this CVE
Guest OSKernel reports status, can opt out, or can disable AVX if microcode is missingLeave the mitigation on (the default)

What Downfall (Gather Data Sampling) is

According to the Linux kernel documentation, when a transiently executed gather instruction hits a fault, it can forward stale data from vector registers. An attacker can then infer that data with cache-timing side channels. The victim does not need to use gather instructions, only vector registers. The buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads, so cross-thread attacks are possible. The kernel documentation lists guest-to-host and guest-to-guest among the boundaries GDS can cross. That is why it matters on a virtualisation host even though the CVE requires local access.

Cisco UCS M5 and M6 firmware for CVE-2022-40982

Cisco documents the fix in the UCS release notes under “Security Fixes”. I did not find a separate Cisco PSIRT advisory for this CVE. The defects and first fixed releases are:

PlatformDefectCVEs in the fixUCS Manager (B-Series and FI-attached C-Series)Standalone C-Series (IMC)
UCS M5CSCwf30468CVE-2022-40982, CVE-2022-435054.3(2b) (16 Aug 2023), 4.2(3h)4.3(2.230207), 4.2(3h)
UCS M6CSCwf30460CVE-2022-40982, CVE-2022-41804, CVE-2023-23908, CVE-2022-373434.3(2b), 4.2(3h)4.3(2.230207), 4.2(3h)

In practice, stay on your release train. Environments on 4.2(3) go to 4.2(3h) or later. Environments on 4.3 go to 4.3(2b) or later, and ideally to the current recommended 4.3 release, which also carries later security fixes. Upgrade the server firmware bundle (host firmware package), not only UCS Manager infrastructure, because the microcode ships in the BIOS. After the reboot, you can confirm the new microcode revision from ESXi (see the related post below).

Downfall mitigation performance impact

With the mitigation on, the results of a gather load are held back for extra time before software can use them. Intel says the impact on most workloads is minimal, but “specific workloads may show performance impacts of up to 50%”. Intel lets users opt out through OS vendor options. On Linux, that is gather_data_sampling=off or mitigations=off. Opt out only if your threat model allows it, for example on a single-tenant host with no untrusted code.

Intel SGX exception: when the microcode is loaded through the FIT (that is, from an updated BIOS), SGX is enabled and Hyper-Threading is disabled, the mitigation is locked on. Otherwise system software can enable or disable it.

Checking a Linux guest (and why EVC is not a fix)

Inside a Linux VM, the kernel reports GDS status in sysfs:

cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Possible values include Not affected, Vulnerable: No microcode, Mitigation: Microcode, Mitigation: Microcode (locked), Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode and, in a VM, Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status. The last one means the guest cannot tell whether the host CPU is mitigated.

In my 2023 lab I also ran the open-source spectre-meltdown-checker in a VM on an affected host before its microcode was updated, with two different EVC modes on the cluster:

wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/master/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
sh spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --variant downfall --explain

EVC Intel “Skylake” Generation:

CVE-2022-40982 aka 'Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)'
> STATUS:  VULNERABLE  (Your microcode doesn't mitigate the vulnerability, and your kernel doesn't support mitigation)
> SUMMARY: CVE-2022-40982:KO

EVC Intel “Broadwell” Generation:

CVE-2022-40982 aka 'Downfall, gather data sampling (GDS)'
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected)
> SUMMARY: CVE-2022-40982:OK

The Broadwell result is a reporting difference, not a mitigation. The checker decides from the CPU model the guest sees (“your CPU vendor reported your CPU model”). The VM still runs on the same physical, unpatched CPU. Treat EVC as a compatibility feature, not a workaround for Downfall. The real fix is the BIOS update on the host.

For bare-metal Linux or guests where microcode is not yet available, the kernel offers gather_data_sampling=force. It uses the microcode mitigation when present and otherwise disables AVX by turning off XSAVE YMM support. clearcpuid=avx does the same. Applications that check AVX incorrectly can break, so this is a stopgap only.

Checklist

  1. Check your CPUs in INTEL-SA-00828 (Intel’s affected processor table, Gather Data Sampling column).
  2. Cisco UCS M5/M6: upgrade the server firmware to 4.3(2b)+ or 4.2(3h)+ (standalone C-Series: 4.3(2.230207)+ or 4.2(3h)+). Other vendors: install the BIOS that contains the 2023.3 IPU microcode.
  3. Do not wait for an ESXi patch for this CVE. Record the VMware statement as the justification in your scanner exception.
  4. Keep the guest mitigation enabled. Benchmark AVX-heavy workloads (HPC, analytics, crypto) before and after.

Sources

Related on vdan.cz

Multi-TEP High Availability

Multi-TEP High Availability

Multi-TEP High Availability

Introduction A tunnel end point (TEP) is a virtual interface that can serve as an uplink for overlay traffic. On an ESXi host, a TEP is tightly associated to the physical interface through which it sends and receives its traffic. In the current TEP high availability (TEP HA) model, a TEP never fails. If the link of the ESXi interface to which a TEP is associated goes down, the TEP is simply moved


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